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FEMINIST JUDGING MATTERS: HOW FEMINIST THEORY 
AND METHODS AFFECT THE PROCESS OF JUDGMENT
Bridget J. Crawford, Kathryn M. Stanchi, & Linda L. Berger* 
INTRODUCTION 
 The word “feminism” means different things to its many supporters 
(and undoubtedly, to its detractors).  For some, it refers to the historic 
struggle: first to realize the right of women to vote and then to 
eliminate explicit discrimination against women from the nation’s 
laws.1  For others, it is a political movement, the purpose of which is 
to raise awareness about and to overcome past and present oppression 
faced by women.2  For still others, it is a philosophy—a system of 
thought—and a community of belief3 centering on attaining political, 
social, and economic equality for women, men, and people of any 
gender.4  
* Bridget Crawford is a Professor of Law at the Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace
University.  Kathryn Stanchi is the Jack E. Feinberg ‘57 Professor of Litigation and
an Affiliated Professor of Gender, Sexuality, and Women’s Studies at Temple
University Beasley School of Law.  Linda Berger is the Family Foundation Professor
of Law at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law.
The authors thank the University of Baltimore Center on Applied Legal Feminism
for sponsoring the conference, and Margaret E. Johnson and Michele E. Gilman for
their support of the United States Feminist Judgments Project and for inviting us to
participate in the University of Baltimore School of Law’s 10th Annual Feminist
Legal Theory Conference.
1. See, e.g., NANCY F. COTT, THE GROUNDING OF MODERN FEMINISM 3 (1987)
(describing early adoption of the term “feminism” during the peak of the woman
suffrage movement in the early 20th century).
2. See, e.g., LISA YOUNG, FEMINISTS AND PARTY POLITICS 4–5 (2000) (describing the
influence of feminism on political institutions).
3. See Rosemary Hunter, Can Feminist Judges Make a Difference?, 15 INT’L J. LEGAL 
PROF. 7, 8 (2008).
4. Roger Scruton, Feminism, THE PALGRAVE MACMILLAN DICTIONARY OF POLITICAL 
THOUGHT (Palgrave Macmillan 3d ed. 2007) (1982) (defining feminism as
“advocacy of the *rights of women and of their social, political and economic
equality with men”).  A more contemporary understanding of feminism also
accounts for multiple genders and gender fluidity; for that reason, we include
“people of any gender” in our definition.  On multiple genders and gender fluidity,
see Diane Richardson, Conceptualising Gender, in INTRODUCING GENDER & 
WOMEN’S STUDIES 3, 19–20 (Victoria Robinson & Diane Richardson eds., 4th ed.
2015).
168 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 47 
For us, the editors of Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of 
the United States Supreme Court,5 feminism is all of those things and 
more.  Feminism is both a movement and a mode of inquiry.  In its 
best and most capacious form, feminism embraces justice for all and 
seeks to ally itself with rights-based movements for people of color, 
the poor, immigrants, refugees, religious minorities, disabled 
individuals, LGBTQ+ people, and other historically marginalized 
groups.  
This essay presents feminism as the foundation for a developing 
form of rich, complex, and practical legal scholarship—the lens and 
the means through which we may approach and resolve many legal 
problems.6  First, this essay explores the intellectual foundations of 
feminist legal theory and situates the United States and international 
feminist judgments projects within that scholarly tradition.7  It next 
considers how the feminist judgments projects move beyond 
traditional academic scholarship to bridge the gap between the real-
world practice of law and feminist theory,8 a move that made the 
publication of Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the United 
States Supreme Court an especially fitting topic for the 10th Annual 
Conference held at the University of Baltimore Center on Applied 
Feminism.9  
When they write feminist judgments (using feminist perspectives or 
methods to produce revised versions of actual court opinions), 
feminist authors translate feminist theory into the language of law 
practice and judging.10  Their translations demonstrate the potential 
for lawyers to incorporate feminist theory and methods into oral and 
written arguments,11 for law students to gain deeper insights from 
and to learn the practical utility of feminist theory,12 and for judges to 
recognize how incorporating feminist perspectives may transform the 
reasoning or outcome of a case without changing the law or the facts 
5. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
(Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger & Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2016).
6. See infra notes 7–14, 87–90 and accompanying text.
7. See infra Parts I–II.
8. See infra Parts III–IV.
9. See 10th Annual Feminist Legal Theory Conference - Applied Feminism and
Intersectionality: Examining the Law Through Multiple Identities, U. BALT. CTR. ON 
APPLIED FEMINISM, http://law.ubalt.edu/centers/caf/pdf/Schedule%202017%20final4
_logos.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2017).
10. See Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger & Bridget J. Crawford, Introduction to the
U.S. Feminist Judgments Project, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, supra note 5, at 3, 5.
11. See id. at 4–5 (“Feminist consciousness broadens and widens the lens through which
we view law . . . .”).
12. See id. at 22 (explaining the benefits of learning and studying feminist legal theory).
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of the underlying lawsuit.13  Finally, this essay uses contemporary 
examples of feminist judging to illustrate that the gap between 
feminist theory and judicial decision making is narrowing, a real-
world advance that suggests a widening judicial audience for 
Feminist Judgments.14  
I. THE INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF FEMINIST
LEGAL THEORY
Feminist legal theory is a twentieth-century innovation that 
involves a synergistic intersection of legal scholarship, law practice, 
and law teaching.15  Its origins lie in the work of the very few female 
law professors (and their male supporters) who came together to form 
the Women in Legal Education Section of the Association of 
American Law Schools (AALS) in 1970.16  Members of this group 
supported each other’s research and advocated for law school 
curriculum development, including the creation of courses in 
“Women and the Law,” which were offered by fewer than ten schools 
in 1970.17  In 1967, women represented only 1.7% of all tenure-track 
professors in law schools; Ruth Bader Ginsburg became the first 
female tenured professor at Columbia Law School in 1972.18  By 
1970, women represented only 8.6% of all J.D. students,19 2.2% of 
13. See Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger & Bridget J. Crawford, Preface to
FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT, supra note 5, at xxix, xxix (illustrating the potential and actual impacts of
the incorporation of feminist theory in judicial reasoning).
14. See, e.g., Stanchi, Berger & Crawford, supra note 10, at 4 (illustrating the
relationship and expansion of the use of feminist theory in judicial reasoning); infra
Part IV (providing examples of real-life feminist judgments).
15. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Jurisprudence: Mainstreaming Feminist
Legal Theory, 23 PAC. L.J. 1493, 1494, 1533–40 (1992) (discussing the origins and
development of feminist legal theory).
16. See Elizabeth F. Defeis, Women in Legal Education Section, 80 UMKC L. REV. 679,
679 (2012).
17. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, In the Beginning . . ., 80 UMKC L. REV. 663, 663 (2012); see
also Defeis, supra note 16, at 679–80 (describing the formation of the AALS
Women in Legal Education Section and the first course on “Women and the Law” at
Seton Hall Law School in 1973).
18. CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 219–20 (Univ. of Ill. Press 2d ed. 1993)
(1981) (citing the percentage of full-time tenure-track female law professors in
1967); CLARICE FEINMAN, WOMEN IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 129 (3d ed.
1994).
19. First Year and Total J.D. Enrollment by Gender: 1947 - 2011, A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_a
dmissions_to_the_bar/statistics/jd_enrollment_1yr_total_gender.authcheckdam.pdf
(last visited Dec. 30, 2017).
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tenure-track faculty,20 and 4% of all attorneys.21  As the women’s 
movement of the 1970s gained influence, the numbers of female 
professors, students, and attorneys increased.22  The increases meant 
more feminist scholarship to educate the academy and more feminist 
teaching to educate students who would then carry those ideas with 
them to law practice.23  
Around the same time, feminist law practice was also thriving 
outside the academy.24  Title VII and Title IX were added to the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, prohibiting sex discrimination in employment 
and education.25  Ruth Bader Ginsburg, together with Pauli Murray 
and Dorothy Kenyon, started the Women’s Rights Project of the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to strengthen the ACLU’s 
approach to women’s rights.26  The Women’s Rights Project became 
a formidable force for women’s rights.27  By the beginning of the 
1980s, women had achieved significant equal protection victories in 
the courts, such as Reed v. Reed28 and Frontiero v. Richardson,29 as 
well as suffering legal setbacks, such as the failure of the Equal 
Rights Amendment.30  By 1980, women represented 34.2% of all 
20. Donna Fossum, Women Law Professors, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 903, 906.
21. Cynthia Grant Bowman, Women in the Legal Profession from the 1920s to the
1970s: What Can We Learn from Their Experience About Law and Social Change?,
61 ME. L. REV. 1, 15 (2009).
22. See, e.g., id.; Fossum, supra note 20, at 906; First Year and Total J.D. Enrollment by
Gender: 1947 - 2011, supra note 19.
23. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Scholarship: A History Through the Lens
of the California Law Review, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 381, 426–27 (2012).
24. See Bowman, supra note 21, at 15.
25. GILLIAN THOMAS, BECAUSE OF SEX: ONE LAW, TEN CASES, AND FIFTY YEARS THAT
CHANGED AMERICAN WOMEN’S LIVES AT WORK 2 (2016) (discussing the passage of
Title VII); SUSAN WARE, TITLE IX: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 3–4 (2007)
(discussing the passage of Title IX).
26. See Tribute: The Legacy of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and WRP Staff, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/other/tribute-legacy-ruth-bader-ginsburg-and-wrp-staff (last
visited Dec. 30, 2017).
27. See Amy Leigh Campbell, Raising the Bar: Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the ACLU
Women’s Rights Project, 11 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 157, 158, 239 (2002) (describing
Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s work with the Women’s Rights Project as bringing about
“profound change . . . in the law”).
28. 404 U.S. 71, 73, 76–77 (1971) (invalidating an Idaho law that gave preference for a
male administrator of an intestate decedent’s estate, as between equally related
individuals).
29. 411 U.S. 677, 678–79, 690–91 (1973) (invalidating a federal law that required
married female service members to prove dependency of spouse in order to receive
certain financial benefits but automatically provided the benefit to married male
service members).
30. See, e.g., MARY FRANCES BERRY, WHY ERA FAILED: POLITICS, WOMEN’S RIGHTS,
AND THE AMENDING PROCESS OF THE CONSTITUTION 70–85 (Ind. Univ. Press 1988)
(1986) (discussing the failure of states to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment).
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J.D. candidates,31 13.7% of all full-time faculty,32 and 8.1% of all
attorneys.33
Coinciding with increased numbers of female law students, faculty, 
and practicing attorneys, feminist theory and practice became 
mutually intertwined.34  The National Conference on Women and the 
Law, held annually from 1970 to 1990, provided a crucial gathering 
place for practicing lawyers, academics, and students, and served to 
“provide a framework for feminist lawyers and theorists to learn from 
each other or to share information about the real life problems of a 
broader group of women, e.g., poor women, disabled women, 
working class women.”35  Feminist attorneys shared their work with 
women who had a variety of needs for legal assistance related to 
poverty, immigration status, imprisonment, sexual abuse, and estate 
planning, to name just a few areas, and feminist academics shared 
their new ideas about how to approach legal problems.36  The term 
“feminist jurisprudence” first came into scholarly use in the 1980s.37 
New legal concepts and claims emerged from these intense 
interactions between feminist legal academics and feminist 
practitioners.38  For example, sexual harassment as a form of sex-
based discrimination would not exist in its current robust form but for 
the work of feminist legal theorist Catharine A. MacKinnon, who 
grounded her findings and recommendations in what she had learned 
through listening to and believing the stories that individual women 
31. First Year and Total J.D. Enrollment by Gender: 1947 - 2011, supra note 19 (citing
data for the 1980–1981 academic year).
32. Richard H. Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Women on
American Law School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 537, 538 (1988).
33. BARBARA CURRAN ET AL., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: A STATISTICAL 
PROFILE OF THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1980S, at 10 tbl.1.3.1 (1985).
34. See Cynthia Grant Bowman & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Feminist Legal Theory,
Feminist Lawmaking, and the Legal Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 249, 249
(1998) (arguing that the study of feminist legal theory and substantive cases taken by
feminist practitioners “reveals a spiral relationship in which feminist practice has
generated feminist legal theory, theory has then reshaped practice, and practice has
in turn reshaped theory”).
35. Patricia A. Cain, The Future of Feminist Legal Theory, 11 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 367,
368 (1997).
36. See id. at 378–81 (providing a first-hand account of the first National Conference on
Women and the Law and subsequent conferences).  Attendance rates increased
significantly from the first conference, which had fifty participants, to the fourteenth
conference, which had over 2,600 attendees.  Id. at 379.
37. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State:
Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 635 (1983);
Ann C. Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J. 375, 376 (1981).
38. See infra notes 39–50 and accompanying text.
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told about their experiences in the workplace.39  Professor 
MacKinnon was co-counsel for Mechelle Vinson, whose sexual 
harassment claim reached the Supreme Court of the United States in 
1986.40  In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Supreme Court 
recognized that plaintiffs should be allowed to pursue claims for 
sexual harassment in situations beyond the “quid pro quo” 
arrangements previously included.41  In Vinson’s case, the Court 
recognized that the creation of a hostile work environment 
constituted sexual harassment.42  
And it was a law professor, Anita Hill, who courageously spoke out 
about her own experiences of sexual harassment while working as an 
attorney for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under 
then-director Clarence Thomas.43  Her testimony during Justice 
Thomas’s Supreme Court confirmation hearings raised national 
awareness of workplace sexual harassment and motivated a new 
generation of feminist activists.44  
Feminist scholarship also helped counteract the result in Geduldig 
v. Aiello,45 the Supreme Court decision upholding a California
39. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN:
A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 4 (1979) [hereinafter MACKINNON, SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT] (explaining that sexual harassment is discrimination based on sex);
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 83, 86
(1989) [hereinafter MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY] (“[Consciousness-
raising is a method in which] [w]omen’s lives are discussed in all their momentous
triviality, that is, as they are lived through.  The technique explores the social world
each woman inhabits through her speaking of it, through comparison with other
women’s experiences, and through women’s experiences of each other in the group
itself.”).  The first case that recognized sexual harassment as sex discrimination was
Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976).  See MACKINNON, SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT, supra, at 64.
40. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
41. See id. at 65 (“[S]exual misconduct constitutes prohibited ‘sexual harassment,’
whether or not it is directly linked to the grant or denial of an economic quid pro
quo.”).
42. Id. at 65–67.
43. David A. Kaplan, Anatomy of a Debacle, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 20, 1991, 8:00 PM),
http://www.newsweek.com/anatomy-debacle-204540.
44. See Bridget J. Crawford, Toward a Third-Wave Feminist Legal Theory: Young
Women, Pornography and the Praxis of Pleasure, 14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 99, 107–
08 (2007) (describing the impact of the Thomas confirmation hearings, specifically
Rebecca Walker’s call for a “third wave,” generational-specific feminist response to
resist misogynist behavior, such as that exhibited by Clarence Thomas and the
members of the Senate Judiciary Committee who undermined Professor Hill’s
credibility).  See generally RACE, GENDER, AND POWER IN AMERICA: THE LEGACY OF
THE HILL-THOMAS HEARINGS (Anita Faye Hill & Emma Coleman Jordan eds., 1995)
(detailing the societal impact of the Hill-Thomas hearings on feminism and
awareness of sexual harassment).
45. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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disability insurance program that failed to include coverage for 
pregnancy-related disabilities.46  The majority had reasoned that the 
program’s distinction between “pregnant women” and “nonpregnant 
persons” was not sex-based discrimination.47  Feminist students, 
scholars, and lawyers responded quickly and uniformly, criticizing 
the Supreme Court majority for failing to comprehend that only 
women were in one of the two categories established by the program, 
making the categorization inherently sex-based.48  In 1978, Congress 
46. Id. at 496–97.
47. See id. at 496 n.20.
48. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
955, 983 n.107 (1984) (citing more than two dozen law review articles written
shortly after the Geduldig decision and criticizing the result, including Nancy S.
Erickson, Equality Between the Sexes in the 1980’s, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 591, 598
(1979); Constance Frisby Fain, Pregnancy and Sex Discrimination, 5 TEX. S.U. L.
REV. 54, 66, 69–70 (1978); Ruth M. Ferrell, The Equal Rights Amendment to the
United States Constitution—Areas of Controversy, 6 URB. LAW. 853, 862 (1974);
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 37–38,
41–42 (1975); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender in the Supreme Court: The 1973 and
1974 Terms, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 8–13; John D. Johnston, Jr., Sex Discrimination
and the Supreme Court—1971-1974, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 617, 678 (1974); David L.
Kirp & Dorothy Robyn, Pregnancy, Justice, and the Justices, 57 TEX. L. REV. 947,
948–51 (1979); Arthur Larson, Sex Discrimination as to Maternity Benefits, 1975
DUKE L.J. 805, 811–12; Mitchel E. Ostrer, General Electric Co. v. Gilbert: Defining
the Equal Opportunity Rights of Pregnant Workers, 10 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
605, 614–17 (1978–1979); Kathleen Peratis & Elisabeth Rindskopf, Pregnancy
Discrimination as a Sex Discrimination Issue, 2 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 26, 28–29
(1975); Scales, supra note 37, at 379–81; Katharine T. Bartlett, Comment,
Pregnancy and the Constitution: The Uniqueness Trap, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1532,
1532–36 (1974); Rhoda Bunnell, Note, The Impact of Geduldig v. Aiello on the
EEOC Guidelines on Sex Discrimination, 50 IND. L.J. 592, 601 (1975); Phillip
Nollin Cockrell, Comment, Pregnancy Disability Benefits and Title VII: Pregnancy
Does Not Involve Sex?, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 257, 257–58, 264 (1977); Harriet
Hubacker Coleman, Comment, Barefoot and Pregnant—Still: Equal Protection for
Women in Light of Geduldig v. Aiello, 16 S. TEX. L.J. 211, 211–12 (1975); Gary E.
Dunton, Case Note, Under a Compulsory Unemployment Disability Insurance
System, a State May Permissibly Exclude from Coverage Disability Resulting from
Normal Pregnancy. Geduldig v. Aiello, ___ U.S. ___, 94 S. Ct. 2485, 41 L. Ed. 2d
256 (1974)., 52 J. URB. L. 591, 600–01 (1974); Sheila Nolan Flick, Comment, The
1978 Amendment to Title VII: The Legislative Reaction to the Geduldig-Gilbert-
Satty Pregnancy Exclusion Problem in Disability Benefits Programs, 27 LOY. L.
REV. 532, 586 (1981); Mariko Gushi, Comment, Three Cases Against Motherhood,
2 GLENDALE L. REV. 313, 315–16 (1978); Gerry L. Holden, Comment, Sex
Discrimination in the 1970’s: The Supreme Court Decisions, 6 TEX. TECH L. REV.
149, 164–65 (1974); Joyce Langenegger, Comment, Pregnancy and Employment
Benefits, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 767, 774, 776 (1975); Joanne L. Levine, Note,
Pregnancy and Sex-Based Discrimination in Employment: A Post-Aiello Analysis,
44 U. CIN. L. REV. 57, 58 (1975); Mark A. Lies II, Comment, Current Trends in
Pregnancy Benefits—1972 EEOC Guidelines Interpreted, 24 DEPAUL L. REV. 127,
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enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), which defined 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy as discrimination on the 
basis of sex under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.49  The 
PDA itself sparked feminist disagreement over whether pregnancy 
should be treated like any other disability or whether it should receive 
“special treatment” because of its unique effects on women.50  
As feminist scholarship grew and matured, it became apparent that 
there was not, nor could there be, a single feminist legal theory.51  
Rather, there are multiple feminist theories and perspectives that 
emerge as women’s lived experiences are the starting point for legal 
analysis.52  Feminist legal practice informs feminist legal theory, and 
feminist legal theory informs legal practice.53  The theories adapt to 
134–36 (1974); John D. Nagy, Recent Development, Geduldig v. Aiello, 3 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 141, 143 (1975); Joyce E. Reback & David M. Reicher, Note, Title VII,
Pregnancy and Disability Payments: Women and Children Last, 44 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 381, 383–84, 389–95 (1976); Barbara Ungar Royston, Note, Pregnancy
Disability Benefits Denied: Narrowing the Scope of Title VII, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV.
173, 180 (1977); Sally Barker Spitzer, Comment, The Supreme Court 1974 Term
and Sex-Based Classifications: Avoiding a Standard of Review, 19 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
375, 391 (1975); Jane Swanson, Note, Exclusion of Pregnancy from Coverage of
Disability Benefits Does Not Violate Equal Protection, 12 HOUS. L. REV. 488, 494
(1975); Virginia Voorhees, Comment, Pregnancy Disability Benefits Under State-
Administered Insurance Programs, 24 CATH. U. L. REV. 263, 263–64, 275–79
(1975); Diane L. Zimmerman, Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy
Classifications and the Definition of Sex Discrimination, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 441,
442–48 (1975); Case Note, Equal Protection — Discrimination Against Pregnancy
Is Not Sex Discrimination — Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)., 1975 BYU L. 
REV. 171, 175–78).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).  For the legislative history of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, see STAFF OF S. COMM. ON LABOR & HUMAN RES., 96TH CONG., 
LEGIS. HISTORY OF THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1978 (Comm. Print
1980).  The PDA affected only Title VII, however.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).  As a
matter of constitutional jurisprudence, Geduldig has never been explicitly overruled.
50. See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the
Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1163–80 (1986)
(critiquing both equality analysis and special treatment and arguing that
responsibility analysis would better address issues of systemic and subtle gender
subordination); Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 34–35, 37–38 (1985) (suggesting that an appropriate
comparison for discrimination purposes is women versus men, as only women can
become pregnant from exercising their reproductive choices); Law, supra note 48, at
1008–09, 1010, 1029 (arguing for heightened scrutiny in pregnancy discrimination
cases); Wendy W. Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 332
(1984–1985) (asserting that the party defending law that disproportionately impacts
one sex must bear the burden of justification).
51. See Bowman & Schneider, supra note 34, at 251–53.
52. See id. at 254–55.
53. See id. at 254 (“[I]t is important to appreciate the critical way in which feminist legal
theory emerged from practice, and the way in which new theoretical insights
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recognize and shed light on the multiple challenges of women and 
other historically disadvantaged groups.54 
By 1990, there was a large enough body of feminist-informed law 
reform efforts and legal scholarship that it became possible to talk 
about feminist legal theory as a distinct mode of inquiry with unique 
concerns and methodologies.55  In 1990, Professor Katharine T. 
Bartlett published Feminist Legal Methods in the Harvard Law 
Review.56  In that article, Bartlett identified three methodologies 
commonly found in feminist scholarship and legal practice: (1) 
“asking the woman question . . . designed to expose how the 
substance of law may silently and without justification submerge the 
perspectives of women and other excluded groups”; (2) “feminist 
practical reasoning . . . mak[ing] legal decisionmaking more sensitive 
to the features of a case not already reflected in legal doctrine”; and 
(3) “consciousness-raising . . . a means of testing the validity of
accepted legal principles through the lens of the personal experience
of those directly affected by those principles.”57  By 1997, Martha
Chamallas had identified three “feminist moves”: (1) “suspicion of
sex-based distinctions and generalizations”; (2) “uncovering implicit
male bias in neutral legal standards”; and (3) “placing high value on
women’s experience.”58  In 1999, Professor Chamallas published her
book Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory.59  Now in its third
edition fourteen years later, Chamallas’s excellent overview of the
field has expanded to include six “opening moves” that feminist legal
scholars make and three different “generations of feminist legal
theory”: moving from the equality stage of the 1970s, to the
“[g]eneration of [d]ifference” in the 1980s, and then to the
formulated by litigators and academics continue to reshape practice.  Indeed, 
feminist legal theory, understood generically, has been the intellectual means for 
argument and debate about issues of equality that first emerged in law reform 
practice and continue to resonate both in practice and in the world at large.”). 
54. See id. at 252–55.
55. See infra notes 56–59 and accompanying text.
56. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990).
57. Id. at 836–37.
58. Martha Chamallas, Importing Feminist Theories to Change Tort Law, 11 WIS.
WOMEN’S L.J. 389, 389–92 (1997) (“Despite the great diversity in feminist thinking
and the multiple schools of feminist thought, there are a few recurring ‘moves’ that
feminists often use in their analyses of the law.  These moves place women at the
center rather than at the margin of the study of law.  You will know you have learned
to think like a feminist when these moves feel as natural to you as distinguishing a
case.”).
59. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (1999).
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“[g]eneration of [c]omplex [i]dentities” in the 1990s and thereafter.60  
Over this period, feminist scholars sought to accommodate new 
complexities: becoming more aware of intersectionalities in order to 
guard against the assumption that all women have shared or essential 
common experiences;61 recognizing “that change is not inherently 
progressive”;62 and acknowledging that women are able to make 
choices without denying the constraints placed on them.63 
The United States Feminist Judgments Project openly embraces its 
connection to the rich tradition and history of feminist legal theory as 
a sub-discipline within legal scholarship.64  This scholarly work 
actively relates to and interacts with legal practice.65  Because of this 
history and interrelationship, we consciously and deliberately chose 
the word “feminist” in our book’s title.66  This choice recognizes and 
honors the feminist scholarship and lawyering that has been 
instrumental in achieving equality and justice for women, men, and 
people of any gender.67  Rather than accept the argument that the 
word “feminism” is too extreme or too political to gain traction with 
lawyers and judges,68 we think it is difficult to be a feminist “while 
accepting and perpetuating . . . negative characterisation[s] of 
feminism.”69  If we were to follow the suggestion that an alternative 
title such as “Gender and Judging” might be less threatening (or more 
attractive) than “Feminist Judgments,”70 we would detach the project 
60. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 4–15, 17–26 (3d
ed. 2013).  The six “opening moves” are (1) a focus on women’s experiences; (2)
exploration of how factors other than gender (such as race, class, etc.) impact
women’s experiences; (3) uncovering male bias and norms in the law; (4) exploring
“[d]ouble [b]inds and [d]ilemmas of [d]ifference”; (5) recognizing that change may
lead to reproduction of male dominance; and (6) unpacking women’s choices.  Id. at
4–15.
61. Id. at 6–7.
62. Id. at 12.
63. Id. at 13–15.
64. See Stanchi, Berger & Crawford, supra note 10, at 3–4.
65. See id.
66. See generally id. at 3 (offering the authors’ perspective on the meaning of
“feminism” as it pertains to the United States Feminist Judgments Project).
67. See supra notes 34–50 and accompanying text.
68. See Hunter, supra note 3, at 9.  We recognize that some objections to the term
“feminism” are based on the apparent exclusion of marginalized groups other than
women.  The definition we have used in our work, as discussed earlier, aims to
include all marginalized individuals and groups.  See supra notes 1–14 and
accompanying text.
69. Hunter, supra note 3, at 9.
70. Nienke Grossman, Assoc. Professor & Deputy Dir. of Ctr. for Int’l & Comparative
Law, Univ. of Balt. Sch. of Law, Remarks at the University of Baltimore Center on
Applied Feminism 10th Annual Feminist Legal Theory Conference - Applied
Feminism and Intersectionality: Examining the Law Through Multiple Identities
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from the distinct methodologies, principles, and litigation strategies 
that brought women formal equal opportunity under the law in the 
first place.  We embrace our attachment to this history, and we hope 
the tone, methodology, and inclusivity of Feminist Judgments: 
Rewritten Opinions of the United States Supreme Court will 
encourage others to think deeply about their own relationship with 
the word “feminism.”71 
II. THE GLOBAL PHENOMENON OF FEMINIST JUDGMENTS
Part I briefly described the history and development within the
United States of the theoretical and practice-based foundation for 
Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the United States 
Supreme Court.72  But that foundation is significantly interwoven 
with international developments in feminist thought.73  In 2004, the 
first feminist judgments project was launched by a collective of 
Canadian lawyers and scholars who called themselves the Women’s 
Court of Canada.74  Hoping to begin “to work out what a 
constitutional theory of equality should look like,” the Women’s 
Panel Discussion on Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice (Mar. 30, 2017) 
(transcript available from the University of Baltimore School of Law). 
71. We also note here some optimism about the future of feminism.  Approximately
two-thirds of all women and one-third of all men self-identify as feminists.
Weiyi Cai & Scott Clement, What Americans Think About Feminism Today, WASH.
POST (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/feminism-
project/poll/.  There are judges who embrace a feminist identity, most notably, of
course, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.  See Elinor Marsh Stormer, Perspectives from
the Bench on Feminist Judgments, 8 CONLAWNOW 81, 83 (2016) (“So I can tell you
that I was a feminist always.  I am a feminist now and I am becoming more of a
radical feminist as I get older, probably because of what I see happening on the
national scene.”).  And we live in a time when feminism is openly embraced by a
diverse cross-section of popular figures such as Beyoncé, Amy Schumer, John
Legend, and Aziz Ansari, not to mention political figures Barack Obama, Michelle
Obama, and Justin Trudeau.  See, e.g., Jaclyn Anglis, 11 Celebs Who Have Defended
Feminism with Powerful Words, BUSTLE (Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.bustle.com/ar
ticles/102888-11-celebs-who-have-defended-feminism-with-powerful-words; Emma
Gray, Justin Trudeau: I’ll Keep Saying I’m a Feminist Until There’s No Reaction,
HUFFPOST (Mar. 25, 2016, 10:05 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/justin-
trudeau-feminism-fatherhood_us_56f448a1e4b014d3fe22a29f; Annika Reno, A Look
at Obama’s Legacy on Women’s Rights, GLOBAL CITIZEN (July 29, 2016),
https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/white-house-legacy-on-womens-rights/;
Stav Ziv, Why It Matters When Obama Calls Himself a Feminist, NEWSWEEK (Aug.
4, 2016, 2:04 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/why-it-matters-when-obama-calls-
himself-feminist-487380.
72. See supra Part I.
73. See infra notes 74–85 and accompanying text.
74. See Diana Majury, Introducing the Women’s Court of Canada, 18 CANADIAN J.
WOMEN & L. 1, 1–2 (2006).
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Court of Canada published a series of six “‘shadow’ judgments,” 
rewritten opinions of the Canadian Supreme Court interpreting the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms from a feminist 
perspective.75  The model of rewriting original court opinions from a 
feminist perspective was taken up in 2010 by a group of English 
scholars in Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice.76  They 
rewrote significant cases (from a variety of courts) on parenting, 
property, criminal law, public law, and equality.77  The English book 
was the direct inspiration for the United States book78 as well as for 
similar projects in Australia,79 Ireland,80 and New Zealand.81  In 
addition, an international-based project is well under way.82  Nascent 
projects focus on Scotland,83 India, 84 and Mexico.85  In the United 
75. Id. at 4–6, 11; Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn & Erika Rackley, Feminist
Judgments: An Introduction, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 3,
3 (Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn & Erika Rackley eds., 2010).  The Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms is within the Constitution Act of 1982.  See
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.).
76. See Hunter, McGlynn & Rackley, supra note 75, at 3.
77. See Table of Contents to FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE, supra
note 75, at ix, ix–xi.
78. See Stanchi, Berger & Crawford, supra note 10, at 6–7 (describing how the United
States editors became acquainted with the U.K. volume and decided to focus on
rewriting Supreme Court decisions).
79. See Heather Douglas, Francesca Bartlett, Trish Luker & Rosemary Hunter,
Introduction: Righting Australian Law, in AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST JUDGMENTS:
RIGHTING AND REWRITING LAW 1, 2 (Heather Douglas, Francesca Bartlett, Trish
Luker & Rosemary Hunter eds., 2014).
80. See Julie McCandless, Máiréad Enright & Aoife O’Donoghue, Introduction:
Troubling Judgment, in NORTHERN/IRISH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: JUDGES’ TROUBLES 
AND THE GENDERED POLITICS OF IDENTITY 3, 3 (Máiréad Enright, Julie McCandless
& Aoife O’Donoghue eds., 2017).
81. See Rhonda Powell, Elisabeth McDonald, Māmari Stephens & Rosemary Hunter, Ko
Ngā Muka o Te Rino: Threads of the Two-Stranded Rope, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS
OF AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND – TE RINO: A TWO-STRANDED ROPE 3 (Elisabeth
McDonald, Rhonda Powell, Māmari Stephens & Rosemary Hunter eds., forthcoming
2017).
82. See Loveday Hodson, Feminist International Judgments Project: Women’s Voices in
International Law, U. LEICESTER, http://www2.le.ac.uk/institution/researchimages/fe
minist-international-judgments-project-women2019s-voices-in-international-law
(last visited Dec. 30, 2017).
83. See @sharoncowan22, TWITTER (May 31, 2017, 9:35 AM), https://twitter.com/sharo
ncowan22/status/869955448346202113 (“Totally fab 1st #ScottishFeministJudgmen
tsProject @UoELawSchool with @VMunro_Law @McGlynnClare @ChloeJSKenn
edy @lizjcampbell @DrSChoudhry”).
84. @FJP_India, TWITTER (May 31, 2017, 6:29 AM), https://twitter.com/FJP_India/statu
s/869908729335959553 (“Our FIRST workshop-‘Feminist Judgment Project:
Gendering Judicial Decision Making in India.’Reading judgments, envisioning FJP
India.”).
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States, editors and authors already have begun work on a series of 
subject-matter-specific Feminist Judgments volumes, including 
rewritten feminist judgments in tax, reproductive justice, family law, 
torts, employment discrimination, trusts and estates, and 
corporations.86 
Viewed as a global initiative, the feminist judgments projects are 
significant from an intersectional as well as a practical legal 
standpoint.87  Rewriting judicial opinions from a feminist perspective 
should be understood as a global sociolegal movement that holds 
tremendous appeal across continents, countries, systems of 
jurisprudence, and areas of the law.  Feminism, as defined in this 
essay, requires us to question the privileges and advantages that arise 
in certain situations and contexts and to work to understand the 
perspectives of human beings whose lives and experiences are 
different from ours.  Similar to its rejection of “essential” 
characteristics that accompany race or gender, our version of 
feminism rejects the nationalist tunnel vision that assumes the 
inherent merit of the beliefs, conventions, and values of developed 
countries or focuses only on the laws and judicial processes of our 
own nation.88  But beyond that, as a practical matter, our world is 
increasingly interrelated and international.89  Modern feminism must 
grapple with issues that do not observe country borders, such as 
immigration, human trafficking, economic inequality, war, and 
85. See E-mail from Trish Luker, Co-Editor, AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST JUDGMENTS:
RIGHTING AND REWRITING LAW, to Kathryn Stanchi et al. (July 7, 2017, 12:38 AM
EDT) (on file with authors).
86. See, e.g., Bridget J. Crawford & Anthony C. Infanti, Introduction to Feminist
Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions (Univ. of Pittsburgh Sch. of Law, Working
Paper No. 2017-05, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=295
1327.  Other volumes in formation include those that focus on Reproductive Justice
(edited by Kimberly Mutcherson), Family Law (edited by Rachel Rebouché), Torts
(edited by Lucinda Finley and Martha Chamallas), Employment Discrimination
(edited by Ann C. McGinley), Trusts & Estates (edited by Carla Spivack, Browne C.
Lewis, and Deborah S. Gordon), and Corporate Law (edited by Anne M. Choike and
Cheryl L. Wade).  See generally Bridget Crawford, Announcing the Publication of
Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the United States Supreme Court,
FEMINIST L. PROFESSORS (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2
016/09/announcing-publication-feminist-judgments-rewritten-opinions-united-states-
supreme-court/ (announcing the subject areas of forthcoming Feminist Judgments
books).
87. See Stanchi, Berger & Crawford, supra note 10, at 21.
88. See generally id. at 15 (describing the emphasis on the “outsider” in feminist
practical reasoning).
89. See Roman Terrill, What Does “Globalization” Mean?, 9 TRANSNAT’L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 217, 218–19 (1999) (discussing a decline in national border
significance).
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environmental degradation.  We must increasingly look outside 
traditional boundaries to confront legal problems of import to 
feminists.  For this reason, organizers of the various feminist 
judgments projects from around the world recently convened at the 
Oñati International Institute for the Sociology of Law to begin a 
conversation about how to coordinate and collaborate to advance 
feminism globally.90  That ongoing conversation is one of the next 
steps in the future development of the feminist judgments projects 
and promises both theoretical and practical gains.  
III. THE PRACTICAL RELEVANCE OF FEMINIST
JUDGMENTS FOR ADVOCACY, EDUCATION, AND
JUDGING
 As a genre of legal scholarship, feminist judgments open up an 
alternative for scholars—one that reaches outside the perceived 
dichotomy of either advocating for reform through direct action or 
criticizing the law and legal developments through passive 
scholarship.91  This advance in feminist scholarship demonstrates that 
there is real potential for change despite current constraints, provides 
models for feminist lawyering,92 encourages law students to more 
critically engage with law and society,93 strengthens feminist 
arguments and feminist theory,94 and supports judicial reflection.95 
First, the turn toward showing—rather than just describing—how 
cases could be decided differently if informed by feminist perspective 
and methodology is significant.96  The rewritten feminist judgments 
concretely demonstrate that the development of the law or the 
outcome of a lawsuit is not inevitable or predetermined, whether one 
is talking about constitutional interpretation or statutory analysis.97  
Any particular feminist judgment is “not a work of academic fiction . 
90. See Workshop Calendar 2017, OÑATI INT’L INST. FOR SOC. L., http://www.iisj.net/en/
workshops/workshop-calendar/2017 (last visited Dec. 30, 2017) (providing a
calendar posting for “11 May - 12 May 2017” titled “Feminist Judgments:
Comparative Socio-Legal Perspectives on Judicial Decision Making and Gender
Justice”).
91. See Stanchi, Berger & Crawford, supra note 10, at 15–17.
92. See id. at 36–39.
93. See Erika Rackley, Why Feminist Legal Scholars Should Write Judgments:
Reflections on the Feminist Judgments Project in England and Wales, 24 CANADIAN
J. WOMEN & L. 389, 392–93 (2012).
94. See infra notes 106–19, Part IV and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 131–37 and accompanying text.
96. See Rackley, supra note 93, at 390–91.
97. See id. at 392, 408.
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. . .  Rather, it is better seen as an alternative history, an exercise in 
the ‘art of the possible.’”98 
By using only the facts that were established and the precedents in 
effect at the time of the original decision, the shadow opinion writers 
demonstrate that the perspective of the deciding judge is a key factor 
throughout the reasoning process.99  A feminist judge is more likely 
to make decisions within context, to take into account detailed 
individual facts about a case, and to consider more broadly how the 
decision will impact women and other historically disadvantaged 
groups.100  This is not to say that all feminist judges will reach the 
same conclusion; rather, feminist judges are likely to bring a 
particular set of sensibilities to the decision-making process.101 
Second, because the rewritten feminist judgments use judicial 
language and tone—with all of the concomitant constraints and 
peculiarities—to give voice to feminist resistance, they provide 
lawyering models for law students, practicing lawyers, and judges.102  
The translation of feminist thought into judicial language is no small 
achievement.  The language of legal decision making is often both 
substantively and linguistically male.103  This characteristic of legal 
discourse made it easier, over the centuries, to ignore issues of import 
to women: many harms against women were literally indescribable in 
legal terms.  Before the phrase “sexual harassment” entered the legal 
lexicon, for example, there was no word for the distinctive harm that 
women were experiencing in the workplace—and if the body of legal 
doctrine contains no word for an injury or a wrong, the law cannot 
and will not recognize what happened as a harm.104  
Because feminist judgments translate feminist theory into practical 
legal writing, the opinions construct a feminist judicial language.105  
As they create a feminist judicial language, the judgments show how 
careful attention to issues of gender, race, sexuality, and other aspects 
of individual identity can be incorporated into judicial decisions 
98. Id. at 392 (footnotes omitted).
99. See Stanchi, Berger & Crawford, supra note 10, at 4–5.
100. See id. at 15–17.
101. See id. at 18–22.
102. See id. at 17, 22.
103. See Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, Talking Back: From Feminist History and
Theory to Feminist Legal Methods and Judgments, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS:
REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, supra note 5, at 24,
51.
104. See Lua Kamál Yuille, Liberating Sexual Harassment Law, 22 MICH. J. GENDER &
L. 345, 379–80 (2015).
105. See Stanchi, Berger & Crawford, supra note 10, at 22.
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while still following precedent.106  The feminist judgments are the 
source of both feminist judicial language and the ideas behind the 
words.107   Both language and ideas can be adopted and used by 
judges and lawyers in a more direct way than typical legal 
scholarship.108  The judgments thus provide a powerful lawyering 
tool, especially for those writing amicus briefs.109 
Consider, for example, Deborah Rhode’s elegant rewrite of 
Johnson v. Transportation Agency,110 a case about gender-based 
affirmative action.111  In Johnson, the employer evaluated candidates 
for the open position of road dispatcher using a scoring process based 
on a number of factors, including relevant experience, seniority with 
the agency, performance at interviews, and work evaluations.112  
Diane Joyce achieved a score only two points lower than plaintiff 
Paul Johnson, while enduring frequent sex discrimination and 
harassment at the Agency.113  In fact, two of Joyce’s interviewers and 
evaluators for the promotion were men who had participated in the 
harassment of Joyce.114  Rhode’s rewritten majority opinion 
criticized the seeming objectivity of the scoring system, noting that 
what looks like merit is usually wholly subjective and often biased:  
In effect, Joyce had compiled an outstanding performance 
record, almost equivalent to that of her male rival, under far 
more difficult conditions and biased evaluation processes. . . 
.  [T]hese concerns . . . underscore a broader point about 
“merit-based” evaluation criteria.  Often ostensibly 
objective criteria mask subjective processes that open the 
door to bias. . . .  [A]s the brief for the American Society for 
Personnel Administration notes, “[i]t is a standard tenet of 
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 22–23.
109. Garret Epps, Professor of Law, Univ. of Balt. Sch. of Law, Remarks at the
University of Baltimore Center on Applied Feminism 10th Annual Feminist Legal
Theory Conference - Applied Feminism and Intersectionality: Examining the Law
Through Multiple Identities Panel Discussion on Feminist Judgments: From Theory
to Practice (Mar. 30, 2017) (transcript available from the University of Baltimore
School of Law).
110. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).  For Deborah Rhode’s rewrite of Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, see Deborah L. Rhode, Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616
(1987), in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT, supra note 5, at 322, 327–40.
111. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 620–21.
112. See id. at 624–25.
113. Id. at 623–24, 624 n.5.
114. Id. at 624 n.5.
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personnel administration that there is rarely a single ‘best 
qualified’ person for a job. . . .  [F]inal determinations as to 
which candidate is ‘best qualified’ are at best subjective.”115 
Rhode’s feminist critique fits seamlessly into the original opinion 
in Johnson, parts of which she left intact.116  The effect of this 
pastiche of feminist rewrite combined with the original opinion is 
noteworthy in that it is difficult, if not impossible, to tell which 
sections of the feminist rewrite of Johnson are the words of the 
original Court and which are Rhode’s.117  Indeed, one law professor 
told us that she challenges her students to discern whether they are 
reading the original decision or the feminist rewrite—and students 
often cannot distinguish between the two.118  This is the source of the 
power of feminist judgments: they enact feminist theory into law 
through the means and force of judicial language. 
Third, this quality of feminist theory written as law makes the 
rewritten feminist judgments a uniquely effective educational tool. 
The judgments help law students connect what might otherwise 
appear to be abstract theory with real-world practice, and they 
encourage students to become more critically engaged with law and 
society.  In law school, students often must choose between courses 
that are largely theory-based and courses that are primarily practical; 
frequently, there is little connection between the two.119  This 
“telegraphs” to students that theory and practice are wholly 
separate—theory is for professors and not for practicing lawyers.120  
The feminist judgments projects undermine that message by 
providing a blueprint for applying theory in practice.121  Only a year 
after the publication of the United States book, at least two stand-
115. See Rhode, supra note 110, at 332.
116. See id. at 327 n.8.
117. Compare id. (rewriting the original judgment on the same factual grounds with a
feminist perspective), with Johnson, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (stating the original
disposition, factual grounds, and reasons for the decision).
118. Interview with Rosemary Hunter, Professor of Law & Socio-legal Studies, Queen
Mary Univ. of London Sch. of Law, in Oñati, Spain (May 11–12, 2017).
119. See generally Kathryn M. Stanchi, Step Away from the Case Book: A Call for
Balance and Integration in Law School Pedagogy, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 611
(2008) (arguing that the “segregation” between doctrinal courses and those that focus
on theory in law school education is pedagogically unsound).
120. See id. at 611.
121. See generally FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT, supra note 5 (writing opinions of the United States Supreme Court
from a feminist theoretical perspective, thus combining feminist theory with the
doctrinal reasoning of the decisions of the Supreme Court, and undermining the
problematic tradition in legal education of separating theory from practice).
184 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 47 
alone Feminist Judgments courses were taught in United States law 
schools122 and several professors reported using Feminist Judgments 
in both doctrinal and skills classes to show how judges and lawyers 
can bring a social justice sensibility to their work.123  A Feminist 
Judgments course is being taught at the Jindal Global Law School at 
O.P. Jindal Global University in the 2017–2018 academic year.124 
Rather than taking everything that judges write in their opinions as 
normal, natural, and inevitable, law students who read feminist 
judgments become more critical readers.125  By reading the original 
opinion and the feminist judgment and comparing the two, students 
are able to look beyond the implicit authority that attaches to the 
original judgment simply because it is the opinion of a court.126  This 
critical distance helps students understand that much of the world 
within which the case took place may have been overlooked by the 
original decision because the process of exercising judgment 
necessarily reflects the judges’ personalities and perspectives as well 
as their backgrounds and experiences.127  As one professor put it, 
“Feminist Judgments was . . . really apt for thinking about this 
question [about writing opinions for social justice] because it offered 
provocative examples of opinions that are inclusive, expansive, [and] 
more responsive to justice concerns.”128  
Fourth, engaging in the process of writing a feminist judgment 
carries intellectual and academic weight for the feminist scholar-
122. Kathryn Stanchi taught a class at Temple University Beasley School of Law in the
Spring 2017 semester called “Legal Research and Writing III: Judicial Opinions:
Critical Drafting and Analysis.”   See Course Description for Legal Research and
Writing III: Judicial Opinions: Critical Drafting and Analysis, TEMP. U. BEASLEY
SCH. L., https://www4.law.temple.edu/courseinfo/CourseDesc.aspx?id=23837&year
= (last visited Dec. 30, 2017) (“The book we use is called ‘Feminist Judgments’ but
the critical reasoning of the course focuses not just on gender, but also on race, class,
sexuality, economic class and masculinity.  The course requires a desire to learn a
new style of writing, a willingness to be deliberate and conscious about how to write
law, and an open mind.”).  At Washington University in St. Louis, Susan Frelich
Appleton taught a seminar called “Feminist Theories, Feminist Judgments” in the
Fall 2017 semester.  See Course Listings, WASH. U. ST. LOUIS, https://courses.wustl.
edu/Faculty/Faculty.aspx/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2017) (enter “Appleton, Susan” into
the Search bar to access course description).
123. See, e.g., E-mail from Andrea McArdle, Professor of Law, CUNY Sch. of Law, to
Kathryn Stanchi et al. (May 19, 2017, 12:06 PM EDT) [hereinafter E-mail from
Andrea McArdle] (on file with authors).
124. Jhuma Sen, Feminist Judgment Project: Reading and Writing Workshop, ACADEMIA,
https://www.academia.edu/33604771/Feminist_Judgment_Project_Reading_and_Wr
iting_Workshop (last visited Dec. 30, 2017).
125. See Stanchi, Berger & Crawford, supra note 10, at 5.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 4–5.
128. E-mail from Andrea McArdle, supra note 123 (emphasis added).
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participant.  In order to develop, draft, present, and defend her 
reasoning and to write about what should happen in the form of a 
judgment, the author will be required to test the strength and 
persuasiveness of her arguments.  She must examine how well her 
theories and commitments hold up when it becomes necessary to 
decide an actual case, taking into account all of its complications and 
history, not to mention the effects of the judgment on the future 
development of the law.  Done well, the rewritten judgment not only 
shows the possibilities of alternative reasoning and results, but it 
strengthens and validates the theories relied upon and the arguments 
made.  Requiring a scholar to present her thinking in the form of a 
judgment shapes the thinking itself.129 
Finally, we hope that some judges who read the rewritten feminist 
judgments will be influenced by them, even if the experience results 
only in added questioning and reflection.  In the words of one of the 
judges who participated in the English project, reading the rewritten 
judgments should be a “chastening experience for any judge who 
believes himself or herself to be both true to their judicial oath and a 
neutral observer of the world.”130 
At a conference marking the publication of Feminist Judgments: 
Rewritten Opinions of the United States Supreme Court at the Center 
for Constitutional Law at the University of Akron School of Law, a 
panel of federal and state judges discussed the relevance of the book 
to their work.131  Many more practitioners and judges attended the 
conference as audience members.132  These audiences are crucial to 
the continuing influence of the feminist judgments projects.  As 
Patricia Cain has pointed out: “Courts and legislatures are more likely 
than the academy to produce real change in individual people’s lives. 
And if the ultimate goal of feminist work in the academy is to make 
real changes in women’s lives, then feminist legal theory needs to be 
useful to the practice of law in real cases.”133  
The discussion during a judges panel at the Akron conference 
suggested that a self-reflective judge reading one of the feminist 
129. See Rackley, supra note 93, at 397–98.
130. Brenda Hale, Foreword to FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE, supra
note 75, at v, v.
131. See The U.S. Feminist Judgments Project: Rewriting the Law, Writing the Future, U. 
AKRON SCH. L. (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.uakron.edu/law/docs/U%20S%20Femini
st%20Judgments%20Program%20with%20moderators%20-%2010.03.16.pdf
(listing a “Judicial Perspectives on Feminist Judgments” panel discussion scheduled
for October 20, 2016).
132. See id.
133. Cain, supra note 35, at 371.
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judgments might begin to question whether her decision making is as 
unbiased as she previously thought.134  After all, the perspective that 
any judge brings to a case is informed by life experience, educational 
and professional background, personal beliefs, and the social context 
in which the case arises.135  These shadow feminist judgments 
challenge judges to understand these influences and consider 
perspectives other than their own.136 
IV. EXAMPLES OF REAL-LIFE FEMINIST JUDGMENTS
Apart from the “shadow opinions” being written by feminist
professors and lawyers world-wide, real-life judgments reflecting 
feminist theory and methods are routinely issued by courts of all 
levels and all jurisdictions.137  In this part, we explore recent 
examples of feminist (and not so feminist) opinions from the 
Supreme Court of the United States: Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in 
Utah v. Strieff in 2016,138 Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in 
Sessions v. Morales-Santana in 2017,139 and Justice Gorsuch’s 
dissent in Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Board in 2017.140  
Although we will classify these opinions as more or less feminist, 
they reflect feminist theory in different ways and using different 
“moves” or methodologies.141 
A. Justice Sotomayor’s Dissent in Utah v. Strieff
In Utah v. Strieff,142 Edward Strieff challenged the admissibility of
evidence obtained after a police officer illegally detained him.143  
Strieff had visited a house that was under police surveillance because 
of an anonymous tip about narcotics activity.144  He was stopped for 
that reason alone.145  After making the illegal stop, the police officer 
relayed Strieff’s identification information to a dispatcher and 
discovered that Strieff had an outstanding arrest warrant for a traffic 
134. See The U.S. Feminist Judgments Project: Rewriting the Law, Writing the Future,
supra note 131.
135. See Stanchi, Berger & Crawford, supra note 10, at 4–5.
136. See supra notes 130–35 and accompanying text.
137. See infra Sections IV.A–C.
138. 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064–71 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
139. 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1686–1701 (2017).
140. 137 S. Ct. 1975, 1988–94 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
141. These examples are not intended to imply that only women judges may issue
feminist opinions.
142. 136 S. Ct. 2056.
143. Id. at 2060.
144. Id. at 2059–60.
145. See id.
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violation.146  The police officer then conducted a search of Strieff and 
found drugs and drug paraphernalia.147  Strieff sought to suppress this 
evidence on the grounds that it was derived from an illegal stop, 
arguing that the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion for the 
stop.148  Although the Utah Supreme Court agreed with Strieff, the 
Supreme Court of the United States reversed.149  The majority 
opinion, written by Justice Thomas, reasoned that the “discovery of 
the arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the unlawful” 
arrest and the obtaining of the evidence, and therefore that the drugs 
and drug paraphernalia were admissible into evidence against 
Strieff.150  Justice Thomas was joined by Justices Roberts, Kennedy, 
Breyer, and Alito.151  Justice Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which 
Justice Ginsburg joined in part.152  Justice Kagan wrote a separate 
dissent in which Justice Ginsburg joined.153 
In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor gave a number of reasons for her 
conclusion that the police should not be permitted to conduct with 
impunity unreasonable searches and seizures.154  For Justice 
Sotomayor, the discovery of the arrest warrant did not constitute a 
sufficient attenuation or “intervening surprise” between the illegal 
stop and the discovery of the drugs and drug paraphernalia.155  The 
brief filed on Strieff’s behalf pointed out that police officers across 
the country routinely used the discovery of outstanding arrest 
warrants to later justify searches that initially were conducted without 
probable cause.156  Drawing a connection between this routine 
practice and a particular circumstance that exacerbated its effects, 
Justice Sotomayor noted that in the town of Ferguson, Missouri, 
16,000 of the town’s 21,000 people had outstanding warrants against 
them.157  Given such overwhelming numbers, the majority opinion 
was essentially handing the police permission to conduct illegal 
stops, as long as the detained individual was discovered to have an 
outstanding warrant and then was searched.158  
146. Id. at 2060.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 2060, 2064.
150. Id. at 2064.
151. Id. at 2059.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2065–66 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 2066.
156. Brief for Respondent at 10–11, Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (No. 14-1373).
157. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2068 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
158. See id. at 2067–68.
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In the part of the dissent that was not joined by Justice Ginsburg, 
Justice Sotomayor wrote from her “professional experiences” about 
the deleterious impact of unlawful stops of pedestrians.159  As she 
explained, “[w]hen we condone officers’ use of these devices without 
adequate cause, we give them reason to target pedestrians in an 
arbitrary manner.  We also risk treating members of our communities 
as second-class citizens.”160  Justice Sotomayor cited law review 
articles and scholarly books to explain the challenges those with 
arrest records must overcome in securing housing and 
employment.161  Further, she explicitly brought race to the forefront 
of the discussion.162  Acknowledging that Strieff was white, Justice 
Sotomayor pointed out that “it is no secret that people of color are 
disproportionate victims of this type of scrutiny,” and that many 
parents of color have “the talk” with their children about how to stay 
safe from the police, “instructing them never to run down the street; 
always keep your hands where they can be seen; do not even think of 
talking back to a stranger.”163  To support her statements about the 
dangers people of color experience in encounters with police, Justice 
Sotomayor moved beyond traditional legal authorities and cited to 
W.E.B. Du Bois, James Baldwin, and Ta-Nehisi Coates.164 
Justice Sotomayor’s reasoning in the Strieff dissent bore the 
hallmarks of the feminist methods and “moves” discussed earlier, 
beginning with her inclusion of contextual facts related to race and 
her decision to speak from “professional experience[].”165  Justice 
Sotomayor employed feminist practical reasoning to reveal 
understandings broader than current legal doctrine when she 
explained the implications of the majority’s decision: “It says that 
your body is subject to invasion while courts excuse the violation of 
your rights.  It implies that you are not a citizen of a democracy but 
the subject of a carceral state, just waiting to be cataloged.”166  
159. Id. at 2069.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 2070 (citing Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in
the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1805 (2012); JAMES B.
JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 33–51 (2015); Kathryne M. Young & Joan
Petersilia, Keeping Track: Surveillance, Control, and the Expansion of the Carceral
State, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1341–57 (2016)).
162. Id. (citing MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 96–136 (2010)).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 2069; see also supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text (discussing the three
common methodologies Bartlett identified in feminist scholarship and Chamallas’s
three “feminist moves”).
166. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2070–71 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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Feminist practical reasoning also was evident in Justice 
Sotomayor’s bringing together of individual lived experiences 
(reflected in quotations from individual defendants in prior cases) 
with the broader historical and social contexts in which illegal police 
stops are made.167  She reflected a concern for individual autonomy 
and the multiple axes along which discrimination may occur,168 both 
of which we identified as common among several of the rewritten 
opinions in Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the United 
States Supreme Court.169  
As already noted, Bartlett and Chamallas view speaking from 
“professional experience” as a feminist move.170  And finally, citing 
to law review articles, books, and sources other than traditional legal 
authority is one of the distinctive characteristics that we identified 
among the opinions in Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of 
the United States Supreme Court.171  Because she uses these feminist 
methods so effectively, the reader of Justice Sotomayor’s dissent 
takes away a much greater understanding of the context in which this 
problem presented itself and an increased empathy for less-privileged 
members of our society.172  
B. Justice Ginsburg’s Majority Opinion in Sessions v. Morales-
Santana
In Sessions v. Morales-Santana,173 the Supreme Court invalidated 
several sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act that treated 
mothers better than fathers.174  Together, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(g) and 
1409 (a) and (c) extended citizenship under some circumstances to 
children born abroad to unmarried parents when one parent was a 
United States citizen.175  When the United States citizen-parent was 
the child’s father, the child could obtain United States citizenship if 
the parent had lived in the United States for five years prior to the 
child’s birth and after the parent had attained the age of fourteen.176  
When the United States citizen-parent was the child’s mother, the 
167. Id. at 2070.
168. Id.
169. See Stanchi, Berger & Crawford, supra note 10, at 21–22.
170. See supra notes 57–58, 165 and accompanying text.
171. See Stanchi, Berger & Crawford, supra note 10, at 12–13.
172. See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2064–71 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
173. 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017).
174. Id. at 1700–01; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(g), 1409(a), (c) (2012), invalidated by Sessions v.
Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017).
175. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(g), 1409(a), (c).
176. Id. §§ 1401(g), 1409(a).
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child could obtain United States citizenship if the parent had lived in 
the United States for one year prior to the child’s birth.177  
The adult child in this case, Luis Ramón Morales-Santana, was the 
son of an American father who had fallen twenty days short of the 
five-year, post-age-fourteen requirement for living in the United 
States.178  After the federal government sought to deport Morales-
Santana for robbery, attempted murder, and other violations of the 
New York State Penal Law,179 Morales-Santana argued that he was 
entitled to citizenship as a matter of equal protection under the Fifth 
Amendment.180  More precisely, Morales-Santana alleged that his 
father (who died in 1976)181 was a victim of constitutionally 
impermissible gender-based discrimination.182  The Court permitted 
Morales-Santana to assert the claim on his father’s behalf citing the 
“close relationship with the person who possesses the right” and “a 
hindrance to the possessor’s ability to protect his own interests.”183 
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion began by providing the 
significant historical context for the applicable provisions of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act: they “date from an era when the 
lawbooks of our Nation were rife with overbroad generalizations 
about the way men and women are.”184  She then took the reader on a 
virtual tour through the core equal protection cases on gender from 
the 1970s185—several of which she litigated186—and determined that 
the Morales-Santana case equally offended the Constitution.187  
“Prescribing one rule for mothers, another for fathers, § 1409 is of the 
same genre as the classifications we declared unconstitutional in 
Reed, Frontiero, Wiesenfeld, Goldfarb, and Wescott. . . .  Successful 
defense of legislation that differentiates on the basis of gender . . . 
177. Id. § 1409(c).
178. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1687.
179. Id. at 1688; Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Bars Favoring Mothers over Fathers in
Citizenship Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/12
/us/politics/supreme-court-citizenship-ginsburg-gorsuch.html?_r=0 (providing
background on Morales-Santana’s criminal violations).
180. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1686.
181. Id. at 1688.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1689 (quoting Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 130 (2004)).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1689–90.
186. E.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
187. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1700–01.
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requires an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification.’”188  In Morales-
Santana, Justice Ginsburg found no such justification.189 
Justice Ginsburg applied the feminist method of looking beneath 
the surface of existing legal rules as she developed a lengthy 
explanation that § 1409 of the Immigration and Nationality Act was 
promulgated at a time when marriages were presumed to be between 
dominant men and subservient women, and when an unmarried 
mother was thought to be “the natural and sole guardian of a 
nonmarital child.”190  Such presumptions, Justice Ginsburg said, 
traded on “[s]tereotypes about women’s domestic roles . . . [and] 
creat[ed] a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination that force[s] women 
to continue to assume the role of primary family caregiver.”191  
At this point, the opinion appeared to be leading toward a positive 
outcome for Morales-Santana.192  If his father were eligible to be 
treated the same as a mother would be treated in the same situation, 
the son would be eligible for citizenship (and could avoid 
deportation).  In earlier cases like Frontiero v. Richardson,193 when 
confronted with explicit statutory discrimination between men and 
women, the Court had granted relief that equalized the treatment of 
men and women at the more favorable level (a remedy that came to 
be called “leveling up”).194  For example, in Frontiero, the first case 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued before the Court, the Court was faced 
with a law that required a married female service member to prove 
the economic dependence of her spouse in order to receive certain 
benefits, while male service members received the benefits 
automatically.195  After Frontiero, married female service members 
automatically received the same benefits that married male service 
members received.196 
But instead of adopting the “leveling up” remedy in Morales-
Santana, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion took a surprising turn.197  Stating 
188. Id. at 1690 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996)).  Justice
Ginsburg, herself, authored the majority opinion in United States v. Virginia.  See
518 U.S. at 519.
189. 137 S. Ct. at 1690.
190. Id. at 1690–91.
191. Id. at 1693 (quoting Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736
(2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
192. See id. (“Correspondingly, such laws may disserve men who exercise responsibility
for raising their children.”).
193. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
194. See id. at 690–91.
195. Id. at 678; 10 U.S.C. § 1072(2) (1970); 37 U.S.C. § 401 (1970).
196. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690.
197. See infra notes 198–201 and accompanying text.
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an obligation to inquire into legislative intent, Justice Ginsburg 
discerned a congressional recognition of “the importance of residence 
in this country as the talisman of dedicated attachment.”198  Because 
of this, she decided that the remedy should be to “level down,” 
making unmarried mothers and their children subject to the same 
five-year rule that applied to unmarried fathers and their children.199  
She concluded that “[g]oing forward, Congress may address the issue 
and settle on a uniform prescription that neither favors nor 
disadvantages any person on the basis of gender.  In the interim . . . 
[the] five-year requirement should apply, prospectively, to children 
born to unwed U.S.-citizen mothers.”200  Thus, Morales-Santana got 
the ruling he was seeking—a declaration that the law was 
unconstitutional—but the result left him subject to deportation.201  
Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, 
and Kagan joined Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion.202  Justice 
Thomas and Justice Alito concurred in the holding, but not in the 
judgment, claiming that Justice Ginsburg had addressed irrelevant 
issues.203  Justice Gorsuch took no part in the case, as oral arguments 
occurred before he took the bench.204  A few commentators 
suggested that Justice Ginsburg’s remedy of “leveling down” may 
have been the only way she could attract the votes of Justices 
Roberts, Thomas, and Alito.205  Ian Samuel decried Justice 
Ginsburg’s decision as “an early contender for the worst thing . . . 
[she] has ever written for the Court,”206 citing in particular the 
uncertainties inherent in Justice Ginsburg’s statement that the new 
rule would apply prospectively.207  Some feminist organizations and 
progressive law professors, on the other hand, lauded the decision 
198. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 U.S. 1678, 1700 (2017) (quoting Rogers v. Bellei,
401 U.S. 815, 834 (1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
199. Id. at 1700–01.
200. Id. at 1701.
201. See id.
202. Id. at 1685.
203. Id. at 1701 (Thomas, J., concurring).
204. See id. (majority opinion).
205. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justice Ginsburg and the Price of Equality, N.Y. TIMES
(June 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/22/opinion/ruth-bader-ginsburg-
supreme-court.html; Ian Samuel, SCOTUS Symposium: Morales-Santana and the
“Mean Remedy,” PRAWFSBLAWG (June 12, 2017, 5:04 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blog
s.com/prawfsblawg/2017/06/scotus-symposium-morales-santana-and-the-mean-reme
dy.html.
206. Samuel, supra note 205.
207. Id. (calling Ginsburg’s remedy “the mean remedy” as opposed to the “nice remedy,”
referring to earlier comments made by him and Dan Epps in the podcast First
Mondays).
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shortly after its issuance.208  Others questioned Justice Ginsburg’s 
remedy for its potential to harm women or impede future equality 
arguments made by women or other disadvantaged groups.209  
Supreme Court commentator Linda Greenhouse speculated that 
Justice Ginsburg’s “over to you, Congress” action “may seem naïve 
in the present political climate, but it conforms with her deepest 
beliefs about the appropriate judicial role.”210  In other words, Justice 
Ginsburg’s remedy was consistent with her view that gender equality 
is the work of all branches of government.211 
Feminist disagreement about the reasoning or implications of 
Justice Ginsburg’s decision in Sessions v. Morales-Santana does not 
make the opinion less feminist.212  Justice Ginsburg’s opinion 
embraced the same strict formal equality principle that frequently 
undergirds a variety of feminist judgments.213  That feminists 
disagree about the usefulness and practicality of that approach in 
different situations is the reason that we talk about feminist theories 
and methods in the plural.214  There is no one correct way of writing 
a “feminist” judgment.  We celebrate disagreement among feminists 
208. E.g., @AnthonyMKreis, TWITTER (June 12, 2017, 7:24 AM), https://twitter.com/An
thonyMKreis/status/874271122124148736 (“!! Justice Ginsburg, in sex
discrimination case, cites Obergefell along with US v. Virginia & Mississippi Univ.
for Women v. Hogan. #SCOTUS”); @JoannaGrossman, TWITTER (June 12, 2017,
7:58 PM), https://twitter.com/JoannaGrossman/status/874460852442812416 (“The
gender stereotypes in the prior cases were so overblown and dated--
that approach was not good for women.”); @nwlc, TWITTER (June 12, 2017, 10:05
AM), https://twitter.com/nwlc/status/874311616954806273 (“Good news:
#SCOTUS affirms Constitution’s protections against sex discrimination in strong
Ginsburg opinion”).
209. E.g., @ProfBCrawford, TWITTER (June 13, 2017, 5:42 AM) (on file with author)
(“@JoannaGrossman Stereotypes could have been eliminated by making men
subject to the same rule as women.  Who is harmed by RBG’s remedy?  Women &
their kids.”); @ProfTracyThomas, TWITTER (June 13, 2017, 9:08 AM),
https://twitter.com/ProfTracyThomas/status/874659675974897665 (“SCOTUS
Denial of Equal Protection Remedy Jeopardizes Equality Law: What was Justice
Ginsburg Thinking?”).
210. Greenhouse, supra note 205.
211. Id.
212. See 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017); see also supra notes 209, 211–12 and accompanying
text (demonstrating that some feminist organizations and activists celebrated the
decision).
213. Stanchi, Berger & Crawford, supra note 10, at 18 (“Formal equality is among the
earliest of feminist legal philosophies. . . .  Formal equality seeks to fix explicit sex
discrimination by asserting that similarly situated people should be treated the same
regardless of sex or gender and that invidious use of a sex classification is
presumptively unlawful.”).
214. Id. at 3–4.
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as worthy of further conversation and inquiry in service of the goal of 
political, social, and economic equality of all.215  
C. Justice Gorsuch’s Dissent in Perry v. Merit Systems Protection
Board
In Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Board,216 the Court was asked 
to decide the proper forum for judicial review when a federal civil 
service employee complains that an adverse employment action was 
based on a prohibited form of bias.217  Because such a claim involves 
both the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA)218 and federal 
antidiscrimination laws, the Court referred to these complaints as 
“mixed cases.”219  Judicial review for non-mixed cases is fairly 
straightforward: claims brought only under the CSRA go first to the 
Merit Systems Protection Board and are subject to judicial review 
only in the Federal Circuit.220  Claims brought under federal 
antidiscrimination law go to a federal district court and the Federal 
Circuit lacks authority to review the results.221  The difference 
matters because the Federal Circuit’s review of decisions by the 
Merit Systems Protection Board is deferential, while the review of a 
claim in the district court is de novo.222 
On the basis that “review rights should be read not to protract 
proceedings, increase costs, and stymie employees, but to secure 
expeditious resolution of the claims employees present,”223 the 
majority determined that the federal district court was the proper 
review forum for a mixed case that had been dismissed on 
jurisdictional grounds.224  In reaching the conclusion, Justice 
Ginsburg, the author of the majority opinion, engaged in a fairly 
lengthy discussion of the statutory language and the precedent 
cases.225  She determined that Perry had advanced “the more sensible 
reading of the statutory prescriptions.”226  In contrast, she wrote that 
the government’s argument—echoed by the dissent—would involve 
“the expense, delay, and inconvenience of requiring employees to 
215. See Hunter, supra note 3, at 9–10.
216. 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).
217. Id. at 1979.
218. 5 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012).
219. Perry, 137 S. Ct. at 1979.
220. Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1) (2012).
221. Perry, 137 S. Ct. at 1979; 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c).
222. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c).
223. Perry, 137 S. Ct. at 1980 (footnote omitted).
224. Id. at 1988.
225. Id. at 1980–82.
226. Id. at 1984.
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sever inextricably related claims, resorting to two discrete appellate 
forums, in order to safeguard their rights.”227  Countering the 
dissent’s contention that the Court had been asked by Perry to 
“tweak” the statute,228 Justice Ginsburg wrote that Perry had instead 
asked only for a sensible reading, one that would “refrain from 
reading into it the appeal-splitting bifurcation sought by the 
Government.”229  Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the majority might 
be viewed as reflective of feminist practical reasoning because of its 
combination of careful consideration of the statutory language and 
the case precedent, as well as the attention it afforded to the question 
of whether taking a narrow view of the language would undermine 
legislative intent and preclude affected litigants, who often proceed 
pro se, from seeking a remedy.230 
In dissent, Justice Gorsuch insisted that the opposite answer was 
clearly the correct answer.  As for his method of reaching this 
conclusion, he stated: “I . . . would . . . just follow the words of the 
statute as written.”231  If the majority thought that the statute needed 
to be changed, Justice Gorsuch suggested another simple solution: “If 
a statute needs repair, there’s a constitutionally prescribed way to do 
it.  It’s called legislation.”232  Continuing in a similar tone, Justice 
Gorsuch further explained, presumably to the majority, that “the 
difficulty of making new laws isn’t some bug in the constitutional 
design: it’s the point of the design, the better to preserve liberty.”233  
The dissenting opinion concluded by accusing the majority of 
“offer[ing] little in the way of a traditional statutory interpretation.  It 
does not explain how the result it reaches squares with the statute’s 
text and structure.”234  
During oral argument in Perry, Justice Gorsuch had pursued a 
similar line of questioning, asking one of the advocates to propose a 
solution that simply followed the language of the statute.235  At that 
point  
Justice Elena Kagan intervened, arguing that the court’s 
decision in Kloeckner v. Solis and cases from all courts 
227. Id. at 1987.
228. Id. at 1987–88.
229. Id. at 1988.
230. See id. at 1980–84.
231. Id. at 1988 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 1990.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1993.
235. Transcript of Oral Argument at 46–47, Perry, 137 S. Ct. 1975 (No. 16-399).
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dating back to 1983 establish that full merits review in 
mixed cases rests with the district court.  To change course, 
she insisted, “would be kind of revolution, I mean, in – in – 
to the extent that you can have a revolution in this kind of 
case.”236 
This dissenting opinion, Justice Gorsuch’s first since taking his seat 
on the Supreme Court,237 further reveals the contours of why feminist 
theory and methods matter in the process of reaching judgments. 
Rather than an exclusive focus on the statutory language, a feminist 
judgment would ask how the statutory language disguises or 
submerges its impact on less-privileged litigants.238  Moreover, a 
feminist judgment would be sensitive to the ways in which a narrow 
interpretation of the statutory language might ignore both the larger 
context and the effects on individual employees.239  And a feminist 
judgment would pay attention not only to the statute, but also to the 
complementary case law and the expectations of litigants as the path 
of the law continued to develop through the accretion of precedent.240 
In addressing difficult issues of legal interpretation and application, 
feminist judges examine the problem from many angles.241  They 
look back, ahead, and around; they tend to pick up the rock and look 
underneath.242  In contrast, the dissent written by Justice Gorsuch 
examines only the rock’s smooth surface—the language of the 
statutes—treating it as both the entirety of the problem and its 
complete solution.243  
CONCLUSION 
As editors of the United States Feminist Judgments Project, we are 
asked from time to time whether we consider the writing of shadow 
opinions to be academic or activist.  This is a false dichotomy.244  To 
the extent that the rewritten opinions demonstrate that the path of the 
law’s development is hardly inevitable, and that feminist theory and 
236. Howard M. Wasserman, Argument Analysis: Pulling Wings off Flies and Other
Efforts to Make Sense of the Civil Service Reform Act, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 17,
2017, 8:41 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/04/argument-analysis-pulling-
wings-off-flies-efforts-make-sense-civil-service-reform-act/.
237. Id.
238. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 225–30 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 214–15 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 231–34 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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method can bring about different reasoning and results than occurred 
in the past, writing feminist judgments is hands-on scholarship that 
goes beyond pronouncements about what the law should be and 
shows what the law could be.245  To the extent that the rewritten 
opinions seek to change minds and draw attention to the continued 
need to work on all fronts for gender equality, then the rewritten 
opinions are a form of activism.246  But of course, all scholarship—
except of the most bland and descriptive variety—is activist (or 
political) because legal scholars are always identifying problems and 
proposing solutions to them.247  If our work on any of the Feminist 
Judgments projects contributes to solving problems of gender 
equality and advancing justice, we gladly embrace the multiple labels 
of scholars, activists, and educators. 
245. See supra notes 96–101 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 105–06, 128, 168–69 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
